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Abstract
We analyze fiscal rules within a Monetary Union in the presence of (i) asymmetric information on
member states’ potential output and (ii) bail-out among member states. The first-best deficit is contingent
on the cycle, that is, on member states’ output gap. In the presence of asymmetric information and bail-
out, the first-best deficit is not implementable. Bail-out lowers the scope for signalling (discrimination)
by member states (lenders) and induces overborrowing by member states characterized by a low output
gap. The Monetary Union can design a mechanism such that a member state with a smaller negative
output gap runs an optimal budget deficit upon receiving a transfer form the Union. We show that, this
‘cyclically-contingent ’ fiscal framework Pareto dominates the ‘cyclically-adjusted ’ fiscal rule currently
enforced by the European Monetary Union. Our model can then account for a situation where both
asymmetric information over cyclical positions and the presence of bail-out among member states does
not induce borrowing distortions.
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1 Introduction
At the beginning of the European Monetary Union (EMU) institutional building process, fiscal rules on
budget deficits were anchored solely to nominal constraints. Maastricht Treaty (1992) defined the so-called
‘3%-rule’, according to which member states must keep each year a ratio between nominal deficit and GDP
not higher than 3%. One of the main rationale for imposing a cap on member states’ deficit is represented
by the possibility – perceived by financial markets – that less ‘virtuous’ member states benefit from more
‘virtuous’ members’ financial help (bail-out) and, therefore, fail to internalize the negative externality they
impose on other Union’s members and on monetary commitment (see, for instance Chari and Kehoe ]1998],
Dixit and Lambertini [2001], Dixit [2001]).1
As a consequence of the 2010-2012 sovereign debt crisis, the ‘Fiscal Compact’ Treaty (2013) has modified
the set of fiscal constraints in the EMU by adding a new rule based on a ‘cyclically-adjusted’ deficit target.
The first questioning of cyclically-adjusted budget deficit as the most appropriate fiscal policy indicator dates
back to Blanchard (1990). More recently, issues with the performance of cyclically-adjusted fiscal rules as
compared to those based on nominal targets have been raised by many scholars (Debrun et al. [2008], Larch
and Turrini [2009], Petrova [2012], Carnot [2014], Corders et al. [2015], Kinda [2015], Andrle et al. [2015]).
At the EMU level, in the June 2015 Economic Bulletin, the European Central Bank acknolwedges that the
fiscal adjustment path dictated by the new cyclically-adjusted set of rules is performing poorly (European
Central Bank [2015]).
The main reason why the eﬀectiveness of cyclically-adjusted fiscal rules might be questioned is that
it ultimately relies on the computation of each country’s potential output, from which – given the actual
observable output level – it follows the size of the output gap.2 However, pinning down countries’ potential
output is very hard, and gives rise to many controversies between the European Commission and member
states’ governments. For instance, in April 2015, seven EMU governments oﬃcially asked the EU Commission
for a revision of the potential output estimation procedures, stressing that the output gap’estimation by
several international institutions (OECD, IMF) significantly diﬀers from the EMU one.
In this paper, we argue that the cyclically-adjusted fiscal rules currently adopted in the EMU are sub-
optimal in the presence of intra-Union bail-out and asymmetric information over the member states’ true
potential output. When (i) national governments know their potential output better than the monetary
union decision-making body does and (ii) the government spending multiplier increases with the magnitude
1The debate fiscal rules’ optimal specification has always been lively and is based upon the diﬀerence in term of stabilization
properties between deficit-based rules (Artis and Buti [2000], Brunila [2002], Buti et al. [2002], and Wyplosz [2002]) and
expenditure-based rules (Bruck and Zwiener [2006]).
2A country’s potential output is defined as the highest real output level - compatible with a stable inflation rate - that the
country can sustain in the long-run.
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of the (negative) output gap, bail-out among member states makes them (a) less eager to signal their true
cyclical position to the financial market and (b) more eager to ineﬃciently over-borrow on the financial mar-
ket.3 The monetary union can prevent an excessive level of over-borrowing by posing a (pooling) constraint
on each member state’s borrowing level based on its own estimates of the member state’s potential output.
Alternatively, the monetary union can design a (separating) mechanism in which member states with smaller
(negative) output gap self-select into the eﬃcient level of borrowing upon receiving (ex-post) a lump-sum
transfer from the Union. We show that, as the prior probability that a member state is characterized by a
high potential output increases, the eﬃciency gains make the separating mechanism we build Pareto dominant
with respect to the pooling cyclically-adjusted fiscal rules.
Our framework is based on two main premises. First, national governments have better information than
Union-level decision-making bodies about their country’s fiscal and cyclical stance. Second, the size of the
government spending multiplier increases in the (negative) output gap.
Concerning our first premise, the presence of an asymmetric information problem between government
layers has been deeply analyzed in the public finance literature. Locwkwood (1999), Bordignon et al (2001),
Cornes and Silva (2002), Besfamille (2003), and Oates (2005) - among many others - argue that local govern-
ments have a superior knowledge of macroeconomic conditions and/or structural parameters of the economy.
Bottazzi and Manasse (2005) explicitly bring the analysis to a monetary union level. They build a model
where the true state of national business cycle is private information, and derive implications for the op-
timal (common) monetary policy. Our contribution follows this line. We assume that member states are
better informed about their potential output with respect to the Monetary Union decision-making body.4In
particular, we study the interaction between this type of information asymmetry and bail-out among states
members of a monetary union, and derive implications for the optimal fiscal policy.
Concerning our second premise, it is supported by solid contributions on both the theoretical and the
empirical sides. From the theoretical viewpoint, Christiano et al. [2009] and Woodford [2010] note that the
spending multiplier is higher during recessions because the economy is most likely to reach the zero lower
bound on the nominal interest rate.5 In particular, the proportionality between slack capacity and output
eﬀects of the government spending stimulus comes from the fact that, because of the higher output gap, the
government-spending-induced increase in output translates into a lower rise in inflation due to the flatter
marginal cost curve which prevails under a great deal of excess capacity. This makes it easier for central
3Analyses on bail-out at the international level can be found in Corsetti et al (2006), and Bolton and Jeanne (2011).
4For instance, member states’ potential output may be thought of as a function of the national government’s past (structural)
investments, where the eﬃciency of past investments – e.g., the fraction of investments that is not spent in socially wasteful
private perks – is national government’s private information.
5See also Manasse [2007].
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banks to maintain a constant real interest rate even in face of an aggregate demand stimulus. This intuition
is empirically confirmed and fairly robust to alternative estimation techniques. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
[2012a] employ a regime-switching structural VAR (SVAR) with smooth transition across states, where the
threshold variable is exogenously determined.6 The authors estimate a quarterly data model (1947-2009)
for the US and find that the output eﬀect of government spending is considerably larger during a recession
rather than during an expansion. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2012b] and Batini et al. [2012] obtain similar
results by looking at a larger sample of OECD countries. Baum et al. [2012] adopt a non-linear threshold
VAR and – more importantly for our purposes – use output gap (rather than GDP growth) to define the
cycle and better identify business fluctuations (see also Harding and Pagan [2002]). They investigate six of
the G7 economies from the 1970s to 2011 and find that in all cases the magnitude of the multiplier size is
increasing with the negative output gap.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 illustrates the current set of fiscal rules in the
European Monetary Union and briefly discusses costs and benefits of targeting cyclically-adjusted variables.
Section 3 lays out the model. We first solve the model under complete information and no bail-out (Section
3.1). We then insert both features and characterize the equilibrium in the decentralized setting (Section 3.2).
Section 3.3. analyzes the optimal properties of two alternative fiscal rules – i.e., a pooling and a separating
equilibrium – along with a Pareto ranking of all the equilibria. Section 4 briefly compares our model to the
European Monetary Union current fiscal framework. Section 5 concludes and oﬀers some policy implications.
2 The Policy Background: the EMU Fiscal Framework
The current European Monetary Union (EMU) fiscal framework is defined by the Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP), by the Treaty on Stability Coordination and Governance (TSCG) – better known as ‘Fiscal
Compact’ - and by secondary legislation which defines the implementation process.7 This framework im-
poses a number of constraints on member states’ fiscal policy aggregates: budget deficit (both nominal and
cyclically-adjusted), public debt, and government spending. At the beginning of each year t, member states
must submit Stability Programmes (SP) reporting the budgetary framework from year t  1 up to year t+3,
so that the compliance with the whole above-described set of constraints can be assessed by EU authorities.
Macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts are made at the national level – either by the government or by
independent bodies – but must be compared with the forecasts performed by the EU Commission, which
6More specifically, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2012a] use a moving average representation of the GDP growth rate.
7SGP has been formulated in 1997 (art.121 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), implemented in 1999,
and modified in 2005 and 2011. TSCG has been signed in 2012 by all EU Member States except Czech Republic and the United
Kingdom. Concerning the secondary legislation, see Regulation 1175/2011 and Regulation 1177/2011.
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ultimately prevail in case of divergences. Here we focus only on the cyclically-adjusted flow constraint: each
country is required to converge at the Medium Term Objective (MTO), identified as a structural budget
deficit – in cyclically-adjusted (CA) terms – net of one-oﬀ and other temporary measures. More specifically,
it is defined as:8
D
CA
t = Dt + "
DY
⇣
Yt   Y ⇤t
⌘
| {z }
output gap
, (1)
where Dt denotes nominal budget deficit, Yt denotes nominal output, Y ⇤t represents potential output, and
"
DY
is the semi-elasticity of the budget deficit (as a ratio to aggregate output) to the business cycle. The semi-
elasticity "
DY
measures the automatic non-discretionary change in nominal deficit-to-GDP ratio in response
to output gap movements. From (1), D
CA
t crucially depends on "
DY
and Y
⇤
t . Although pinning down "
DY
is
not without potential ambiguity (see Mourre et al. [2013]), we focus on the estimation of Y
⇤
t .9 In 2002, the
EU Council has established that the reference method for the estimation of member states’ potential output
is the ‘production function approach’. This method computes potential output on the basis of a standard
technology-augmented Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale on potential capital
and labour (Denis et al. [2002], Roeger [2006]). Technology is estimated through a bivariate Kalman Filter
that exploits the link between its cyclical component and the degree of capacity utilization measured using
the Capacity Utilization Indicator (for the manufacturing sector) and the Business Survey Capacity Indicator
(for the manufacturing sector, the construction sector, and services). Potential capital stock, measured by
the perpetual inventory method, corresponds to its actual value, under the assumption of full utilization
of the existing stock. The capital is extrapolated in the out-of-sample period according to a given profile
of productive investment (estimated through an AR(2) process) and assuming a constant depreciation rate
(Cacciotti et al. [2014]). Potential labour is calculated by a Kalman filter estimation of country-specific
NAWRU, where the trend component is a random walk with drift, and the cyclical component is given by
a Phillips Curve which relates the change in wage inflation to the unemployment rate and other exogenous
variables (e.g., terms of trade and wage share). Particularly for the estimation of potential labour, the choice
of some parameters (bounds of the shocks to trend, cycle and Phillips curve’s slope) is crucial in determining
the NAWRU and therefore the potential output (see Italy’s Stability Programme, pp. 18-24).
Since 2015, the EU fiscal framework also makes the convergence speed towards the MTO dependent
on cyclical conditions (i.e., magnitude and sign of the output gap) and debt-to-GDP ratio (EU Commis-
8Examples of temporary measures are sales of non-financial assets, receipts of auctions of public owned licenses, tax amnesties,
etc..
9"
DY
is computed as the weighted diﬀerence between the elasticities of, respectively, revenue-to-GDP and expenditure-to-
GDP to output, where the weights are given by the ten-years moving averages of output shares of revenue and expenditure.
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sion [2015]), thus further strengthening the countercyclical nature of fiscal rules. Through this important
modification, the EU Commission further highlights the importance of countries’ cyclical positions for the
convergence towards the MTO and the achievements of the fiscal target.
The evaluation of the eﬀectiveness of cyclically-adjusted fiscal rules presents both benefits and risks.
On one hand, provided that they are able to correctly pin down the true potential output level, they are
more suited to identify countries’ true fiscal stance, irrespective of business cycle fluctuations. They also
force member states to pursue optimal countercyclical fiscal policies, while providing them with a safety
margin (up to the 3% limit) to expand the budget in response to negative output fluctuations, and viceversa
(Siu [2004], Andres and Domenech [2006], Manasse [2007]). On the other hand, the main problem with
cyclically-adjusted rules is that they require rigorous calculation and estimation of latent variables that are
unobservable both ex-ante and ex-post. Particularly, the estimation of potential labour and TFP is extremely
sensitive to parameters’selection, and the complexity of the procedure does not promote full transparency
and accountability. Also the estimation of potential capital stock is troublesome, as it is derived as the sum of
past investments that, in turn, are the most cyclical component of aggregate demand (see Cottarelli [2015]).
Hence the final estimation might reflect past demand conditions rather than the structural supply features of
an economy. Marcellino and Musso [2011] and Tereanu et al. [2014] document that mistakes in fiscal policy
prescriptions due to the unreliability of potential output estimation can result in wrong fiscal adjustments,
whose size is up to 1.5 per cent of GDP. Masten and Gnip [2016] compare the current EMU methodology to
an alternative one derived from a DSGE estimation, and find that the former tend to over-estimate the role
of discretionary fiscal policy. As a result, policy prescription turn out to be wrong.
As described in the introduction, in this paper we take the view that potential output is mainly de-
termined by information on which national governments have a comparative advantage with respect to the
monetary union decision-making body. Generally speaking, this assumption is supported by the fact that –
for instance – national governments know the ‘eﬀectiveness’ of structural investments/reforms better than the
EU. Particularly, given the method currently employed by EU institutions outlined in this section, we argue
that crucial features of the output gap estimation and, thus, of the country’s cyclical position (such as shocks
to Kalman filter’s latent components, which are necessary to initialize the filter and obtain the estimation
of potential labour) are better known by member states. Equivalently, given the assumption that spending
multipliers are increasing functions of capacity slack, the information asymmetry can be easily transferred
to the multiplier’s size. Both early reduced-form expressions (Keynes [1936]) and more recent ones based on
deep structural parameters (Hall [2009], Woodford [2012]) highlight that the ex-ante output eﬀect of gov-
ernment spending is determined by parameters on which is easy to assume the existence of an information
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advantage in favour of the member state. Given this information asymmetry, national governments have an
incentive to over-estimate their output gap to be allowed a higher nominal deficit (see equation (1)). In our
view, together with the presence of bail-out, this is the source of the problem generated by cyclically-adjusted
fiscal rules within a monetary union.
3 The Model
Consider two countries Si , for i = 1, 2, belonging to a monetary union (MU) acting through an independent
decision-making body. Each country finances public expenditures by recurring to both taxes and competitive
outside investors. For the sake of simplicity, we normalize taxes to zero.10 Hence, in our simplified framework,
public expenditures correspond to (primary) deficit Di 2 [0,+1), for i = 1, 2. As we intend to mimic a
short-run macroeconomic framework, we assume that deficit spending Di has real eﬀects, i.e., it has a positive
eﬀect on income level Yi because of, for instance, nominal rigidities. We abstract from any disaggregation of
Di into diﬀerent public spending categories that might entail alternative multipler eﬀects.
Each member state Si produces a stochastic end-of-period output Yi (✓i , Di , µi), where µi is a random
variable, and where ✓i 2
 
✓, ✓¯
 
represents Si ’s cyclical position with respect to its potential output, with
✓¯ > ✓, for i = 1, 2. More specifically, when ✓i = ✓¯ (✓i = ✓), the absolute value of Si ’s ‘output gap’ is large
(small): given some initial condition on the output produced before the beginning of the (accounting) period,
a large (small) output gap implies a large (small) ‘potential output’. Si knows its type ✓i – i.e., it knows its
current cyclical position as compared to its potential output – but MU does not. MU attaches probability
↵i to ✓i = ✓¯, and (1  ↵i) to ✓i = ✓, for i = 1, 2. Because we are only interested in short-run macroeconomic
stabilization, we assume that potential output is exogenous and unaﬀected by Di .
Given (✓i , Di), the random variable µi generates a probability density function fi (Yi | ✓i , Di) and a
distribution function Fi (Yi | ✓i , Di) for Yi , for i = 1, 2. We closely follow Innes [1991], and assume fi (· )
is continuosly diﬀerentiable on [di (✓i) ,K (✓i , Di)], for i = 1, 2, where K (· ) > di (·) whenever Di > 0, for
i = 1, 2. Also, following our discussion in Section 1, we assume that a higher output gap ✓ and a higher deficit
D generate better output distributions in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. More specifically, by
removing the subscript i for simplicity, we have:
F✓ (Y ) < 0, FD (Y ) < 0, and FD✓ (Y ) < 0, (2)
8Y 2 [0,K (d,D)], were subscripts denote partial derivatives. The last inequality in (2) implies that a larger
output gap is associated with a higher multiplier of government spending.11 We finally assume that the
10Our normalization implies that Si invests all the collected taxes, for i = 1, 2.
11As argued at the end of Section 2, this allows our model to be based equivalently either on the asymmetry about potential
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expected output E [Yi | ✓i , Di ] is increasing and concave in Di , and the Inada conditions hold, for i = 1, 2.12
Financial Market and Bail-out. Si , for i = 1, 2, signs a debt contract with perfectly competitive and risk
neutral lenders. The contract consists of the amount Di borrowed by Si and a return Ri (Yi) = zi for lenders
to be paid at the end of the period. We take the return on a risk-free bond to be equal to zero. Like MU ,
lenders attach probability ↵i to ✓i = ✓¯, and (1  ↵i) to ✓i = ✓, for i = 1, 2.
In case Yi < zi , lenders receive:
Ri
 
Yi , xij
 
= min
 
Yi + xij , zi
 
, (3)
where xij   0 denotes the amount of debt Di repaid to Si ’s creditors by Sj , for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j:
this construction captures bail-out among states which are members of a monetary union. The presence of
free-rider problems in a monetary union - in which member state borrow in a common currency - has been
widely discussed in the literature (Buiter et al. [1993], Beetsma and Uhlig [1999], von Hagen and Eichengreen
[1996], Lane [2012]). The attempt to overcome it by inserting an explicit ‘no-bail-out clause’ in the Maastricth
Treaty (art. 125 of the Lisbon Treaty) has proved pretty much ineﬀective, as sovereign debt crisis in the
Eurozone displayed its eﬀects.
Utility Functions. Si’s utility function is:
Ui (✓i , Di) = ti (✓i) +
K(✓i ,Di)ˆ
zi
[(Yi   zi) fi (Yi | ✓i , Di)] dYi  
zjˆ
dj
⇣
✓j
⌘ min
⇥ 
zj   Yj
 
, xji
⇤
fj
 
Yj | ✓j , Dj
 
dYj , (4)
for ✓i 2
 
✓, ✓¯
 
, where ti (✓i) 2 R represents an ex-post type-contingent transfer from MU – and, therefore,
Sj – to Si , for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j.13 The second term in the right-hand-side (RHS) in (4) is the (expected)
cost to Si of bailing Sj out. We assume debt repayment to lenders is senior with respect to transfers to MU .
However, transfers received from MU cannot be used to repay lenders.14
MU ’s utility function is:
V =
2X
i=1
↵iUi (✓, Di) + (1  ↵i)Ui
 
✓¯, Di
 
. (5)
output level or the size of government spending multiplier.
12As we disregard long-run considerations, the marginal utility of income is always increasing, so that national governments
are not satiated with the closing of output gap because of political short-termism (see, for instance, Dixit and Lambertini [2001]
and Ferrè [2008]).
13In particular, while Di is borrowed on the financial market at the beginning of the period, the transfer ti is cleared at the
end of the period, i.e., after the realization of Yi is observed by all the players, for i = 1, 2.
14Given the simplifying assumptions we state below, imposing that transfers from MU cannot be used to repay lenders does
not aﬀect our analysis.
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where the transfers {t1 , t2} cancel out in MU ’s utility.
Simplifying Assumption. In the following, we simplify our framework by shutting down both asymmetric
information and bail-out for S1 so as to focus on their joint eﬀect on S2 and MU . We assume d1   D
⇤
1
+ x¯,
for ✓1 2
 
✓, ✓¯
 
, and for D
⇤
1
to be defined below (A1). We further take f1 (Y1 | ✓1 , D1) to be independent
of ✓1 (A2). A1 and A2 will allow us to focus on the case in which (i) asymmetric information about S1 ’s
cyclical position plays no role and (ii) S1 does not default on its debt contract and can possibly bail S2 out
by at least a fixed amount x¯. We also assume that lenders expect x¯ to be the maximum amount of S2 ’s debt
repaid by S1 (A3). Finally, we impose (A4):
0 = d2 (✓) < D
⇤
2
 
✓¯
   d2  ✓¯  , (6)
for D
⇤
2
 
✓¯
 
to be defined below.
GivenA1-A3, our focus is on the eﬀect of asymmetric information and bail-out (by S1) on S2 ’s government
spending and MU ’s optimal policies. A4 further simplifies our framework by making bail-out relevant for
✓2 = ✓ only (i.e., it ensures that the ✓¯ type does not default on its debt when D2  D
⇤
2
 
✓¯
 
). Finally, notice
that A1-A3 imply that S2 ’s default does not have any (contagion) eﬀect on S1
Timing. We analyze a one-period dynamic game. At the beginning of the period, Nature draws ✓i, and this is
perfectly revealed to Si , for i = 1, 2. MU sets a type contingent mechanism {t2 (✓2) , D (✓2)}, for ✓2 2
 
✓, ✓¯
 
.
Given {t2 (✓2) , D (✓2)}, Si announces an investment level Di, and competitive investors decide whether to
lend Di subject to a repayment zi , for i = 1, 2. Finally, Yi realizes, borrowers repay lenders, and transfers ti
are made by MU , for i = 1, 2. Our solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE ).
In what follows, we first characterize the optimal solution – which will serve as benchmark – without either
asymmetric information or bail-out (Section 3.1). We then insert both the above features and characterize a
‘decentralized’ equilibrium (Section 3.2). We finally derive the equilibrium under a (i) ‘separating’ mechanism
and (ii) ‘pooling’ rule (Section 3.3), and present a Pareto ranking of all the equilibria. When deriving the
optimal pooling constraint on borrowing, we will assume that MU can fully restrict Si’s choice of Di to the
proposed mechanism.
3.1 The Benchmark: Symmetric Information absent Bail-out.
Suppose ✓2 is perfectly observable by all the parties and bail-out is not allowed (i.e., x12 = 0). Because
lenders are competitive, we expect S2 to appropriate the entire surplus generated by government spending.
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More specifically, S2 solves:
max
{D2}
E [Y2 | ✓2 , D2 ]  E [R2 (Y2) | ✓2 , D2 ] , (7)
s.t. E [R2 (Y2) | D2 , ✓2 ] = D2 ,
where the constraint represents the zero-profit condition for lenders, and where we assume that the objective function
is quasiconcave in D2 . From (7), S2 solves:
max
{D2}
K(✓2 ,D2)ˆ
0
Y2f2 (Y2 | ✓2 , D2) dY2  D2 , (8)
which gives us the symmetric information optimal borrowing D
⇤
2
(✓2), for ✓2 2
 
✓, ✓¯
 
. From (2), because FD✓ (Y ) <
0, we have D
⇤
2
 
✓¯
 
> D
⇤
2
(✓). That is, absent any information asymmetry or bail-out mechanism, optimality
requires the high-potential output type to borrow more than the low-potential output type because - given
our assumptions - it can exploit a higher spending multiplier.
3.2 Asymmetric Information and Bail-out
The investment pair
 
D
⇤
2
 
✓¯
 
, D
⇤
2
(✓)
 
also represents the eﬃcient level of investment that maximizes MU ’s
utility. However, due to both (i) asymmetric information over ✓2 and (ii) bail-out by S1 of S2 , the eﬃcient
investment may not be achieved in a decentralized setting.
To show our result, we first need to define (a) S2 ’s indiﬀerence curves and (b) lenders’ oﬀer curves. Let
us set t2 (✓2) = 0 and, from A1, x21 = 0. S2 ’s indiﬀerence curve IC (✓2) is the set of points on the (D2 , z2)
space that yield a common utility level to S2 .
U2 (✓2 , D2 , z2) =
K(✓2 ,D2)ˆ
z2
(Y2   z2) f2 (Y2 | ✓2 , D2) dY2 = U¯ (✓2) , (9)
for ✓2 2
 
✓, ✓¯
 
. A lender’s oﬀer curve is the set of points on the (D2 , z2) space that yield an expected profit
equal to zero. As in Innes [1991], it useful to distinguish the separating oﬀer curves from the pooling one. For
expositional purposes, we first define the oﬀer curves for the case in which bail-out is absent, and we then
discuss how they are modified with the inclusion of of bail-out. The separating oﬀer curve OC (✓2) is:
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R2 (✓2 , D2 , z2) = E [Y2 | ✓2 , D2 ] 
2664
K(✓2 ,D2)ˆ
z2
(Y2   z2) f2 (Y2 | ✓2 , D2) dY2
3775 D2 = 0, (10)
for ✓2 2
 
✓, ✓¯
 
. The pooling oﬀer curve OC
P
is:
↵2R2
 
✓¯, D2 , z2
 
+ (1  ↵2)R2 (✓, D2 , z2) = 0. (11)
Unlike Innes [1991], the separating and the pooling oﬀer curves are aﬀected by bail-out (x12).
In the following, we assume (A5):
x¯    d2  ✓¯   d2 (✓)  . (12)
The potential bail-out from S1 (x¯) is suﬃciently high to make ✓ type identical to ✓¯ type, i.e., both types
have a zero probability of default for suﬃciently low values of D2 (see A4).
In our model, bail-out aﬀects the loan payment z2 (from (3)). Hence, in the presence of bail-out, the oﬀer
curve in (10) is independent of ✓2 , and is equal to (11).
We follow Innes [1991], and we impose that when S2 is characterized by a large output gap (✓¯ type) it
has steeper indiﬀerence curves than when facing a small output gap (✓ type):
dz2
dD2
|U¯(✓¯)=  
@U2(✓¯,·)
@D2
@U2(✓¯,·)
@z2
>  
@U2 (✓,·)
@D2
@U2 (✓,,·)
@z2
=
dz2
dD2
|U¯(✓), (13)
where the indiﬀerence curve is upward sloping because:
@U2 (✓2 , ·)
@D2
=  
K(✓2,D2)ˆ
z2
@F2 (Y2 | ✓2,D2)
@D2
dY2 > 0, (14)
@U2 (✓2 , ·)
@z2
=   (1  F (z2 | ✓2,D2)) < 0, (15)
for ✓2 2
 
✓, ✓¯
 
. Finally, the lenders’ oﬀer curves are upward sloping:
dz2
dD2
|R2(✓2)=0  1, for ✓2 2
 
✓, ✓¯
 
, (16)
where, absent bail-out, the slope of the oﬀer curve is decreasing in ✓2 . As we pointed out above, given
A4-A5, in the presence of bail-out the oﬀer curve in (10) is independent of ✓2 (and lies on the 45
 
line, for
D2  d2
 
✓¯
 
).
Figure 1 illustrates the pair of contracts that arise in (i) a symmetric information setting without bail-out
and (ii) an asymmetric information setting in the presence of bail-out. The oﬀer curves OC
P
and OC (✓2),
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Figure 1: Equilibria under (i) Complete Information and (ii) Asymmetric Information and
Bail-out.
for ✓2 2
 
✓, ✓¯
 
, are depicted for the case in which bail-out is absent. In the presence of bail-out, there is a
unique oﬀer curve given by OC
 
✓¯
 
. Indiﬀerence curves are also depicted (in blue for the ✓ type and in red
for the ✓¯ type); higher levels of utility correspond to indiﬀerence curves moving ’southward’. The ‘complete
information allocations’ are represented by the pair
 
E
⇤
(✓) , E
⇤  
✓¯
  
, where the indiﬀerence curves for each
type are tangent to the corresponding oﬀer curves.
Let us denote by a superscript B (for bail-out) S2 ’s optimal borrowing in the presence of bail-out and
asymmetric information.
Proposition 1. In the presence of bail-out and asymmetric information, S2 does not signal its type to the
financial market. The ✓¯ type borrows optimally, i.e., D2
 
✓¯
 
= D
⇤
2
 
✓¯
 
, while the ✓ type over-borrows on the
financial market, i.e., D2 (✓) = D
B
2
(✓) > D
⇤
2
(✓), where D
B
2
(✓) < D
⇤
2
 
✓¯
 
.
Proof. First, given A4-A5, in the presence of bail-out both types of S2 are identical and risk-free to lenders.
Bail-out hence implies that the two separating oﬀer curves in (10) are identical and equal to OC
 
✓¯
 
, which
12
in turn implies that the pooling oﬀer curve in (11) is also identical to OC
 
✓¯
 
. Hence, because there is no
cross-subsidization between types, on the one hand the ✓¯ type has no incentive to signal its type, and invests
optimally D2
 
✓¯
 
= D
⇤
2
 
✓¯
 
; on the other hand, because bail-out lowers the ✓ type’s probability of default,
the ✓ type sets:
D
B
2
(✓, x¯) = argmax
D2
K(·)ˆ
z2
(Y2   z2) f2 (Y2 | ✓, D2) dY2 (17)
s.t.
max{z2 x¯,0}ˆ
0
Y2f2 (Y2 | ✓, D2) dY2 +
K(·)ˆ
max{z2 x¯,0}
z2f2 (Y2 | ✓, D2) dY2 = D2 ,
where, given A1-A5, the constraint can be written as z2 (x¯) = D2 , as long as D
B
2
(✓, x¯) < D
⇤
2
 
✓¯
 
. Therefore:
D
B
2
(✓, x¯) = argmax
D2
K(·)ˆ
D2
(Y2  D2) f2 (Y2 | ✓2 , D2) dY2 (18)
Hence, because z2 (✓, x¯) < z2 (✓, 0), we have D
B
2
(✓, x¯) > D
⇤
2
(✓). Also, D
B
2
(✓, x¯) < D
⇤
2
 
✓¯
 
(from FD✓ < 0
in (2)), which finally confirms that z2 (x¯) = D2 .
The pair
n
E
B
(✓) , E
⇤  
✓¯
 o
in Figure 1 represents the decentralized equilibrium – that is, the equilibrium
absent MU ’s intervention – under asymmetric information and in the presence of bail-out. The ineﬃcient
over-investment by the ✓ type is caused by the potential bail-out (perceived by lenders) amongMU ’s member
states. The member state with a lower potential output – and, therefore, a lower marginal productivity of
government spending – tends to overborrow because it does not internalize the bail-out by S1. At the same
time, because potential bail-out is internalized by the financial market, neither lenders require any signalling
by S2 , nor the member state with a higher potential output needs to signal its type by, for instance, over-
borrowing (see Innes [1991]).15 16 As a result, both sides of the debt contract do not have incentives to
discriminate among types, and the member state with a low potential output issues debt in excess.
In order to analyze S1 ’s utility, let us denote its expected level of utility when
n
E
B
(✓) , E
⇤  
✓¯
 o
emerges,
as U
B
1
(↵2).
Lemma 1. In the presence of bail-out and asymmetric information, S1 ’s expected utility in the decentralized
equilibrium is increasing in ↵2 .
15Compared to Innes [1991], Figure 1 depicts the case in which (absent bail-out) asymmetric information would call for the
✓¯ type to over-invest – i.e., borrow some D0
2
 
✓¯
 
> D
⇤
2
 
✓¯
 
– to signal to lenders the higher value of its multiplier of government
spending with respect to that of the ✓ type.
16Our ’no-signalling’ result hinges on bail-out from S1 to make ✓ type identical to ✓¯ type (see A5). More generally, bail-out
(at least) partially dilutes the diﬀerence between types of borrowers: hence, by reducing cross-subsidization, bail-out reduces
the incentives for signalling.
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Proof. First, define U
⇤
1
= maxD1
´ K(·)
D1
Y1f1 (Y1 | D1) dY1  D1 , where we define as D
⇤
1
the value of D1 that
solves the optimization problem. We have:
U
B
1
(↵2) = ↵2U
⇤
1
+ (1  ↵2)
2666664U
⇤
1
 
z2
✓
x¯,D
B
2
◆
ˆ
0
min
h
z2
⇣
x¯, D
B
2
⌘
  Y2 , x¯
i
f2
⇣
Y2 | ✓, D
B
2
⌘
dY2| {z }
Bail out Component
3777775 , (19)
where, from A1-A5 and Proposition 1, we have z2
⇣
x¯, D
B
2
⌘
= D
B
2
and min
h
D
B
2
  Y2 , x¯
i
= D
B
2
 Y2 . We can
then rewrite (19):
U
B
1
(↵2 , x¯) = U
⇤
1
  (1  ↵2)
D
B
2ˆ
0
⇣
D
B
2
  Y2
⌘
f2
⇣
Y2 | ✓, D
B
2
⌘
dY2 , (20)
where the RHS is increasing in ↵2 .
To sum up, in the presence of asymmetric information and bail-out, (i) member states do not have
incentives to signal their types, nor the financial market requires them to do so, (ii) the low-potential output
type ineﬃciently over-borrows on the market, as it is proteced by the bail-out umbrella, and (iii) a higher
prior probability that S2 has a high-potential induces a lower the expected cost of bail-out and, therefore,
leads to a higher expected welfare for S1 .
We now investigate MU ’s possible interventions to re-establish an eﬃcient level of borrowing at the
Monetary Union level, along with their impact on all member states’ level of expected utility.
3.3 Fiscal Rules Under Asymmetric Information and Bail-out
From MU ’s viewpoint, bail-out causes an ineﬃcient over-borrowing by the ✓ type of S2 . MU ’s objective
is then to implement the eﬃcient choices
 
D
⇤
2
(✓) , D
⇤
2
 
✓¯
  
given the presence of bail-out and asymmetric
information.
We first investigate the possibility for MU to build a mechanism
  
t2 (✓) , D
⇤
2
(✓)
 
,
 
t2
 
✓¯
 
, D
⇤
2
 
✓¯
   
to
separate the two types of S2 .17 We then solve our model for MU ’s optimal pooling equilibrium, i.e., for
the equilibrium in which MU sets a rule on S2 ’s borrowing independent of its type ✓2 . We finally study
the conditions under which the separating mechanism we build is Pareto eﬃcient from the Monetary Union
viewpoint with respect to the pooling mechanism and the decentralized solution
⇣
D
B
2
(✓) , D
⇤
2
 
✓¯
 ⌘
.
17The revelation principle applies. Hence, we focus on direct revelation mechanisms.
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3.3.1 MU’s Separating Mechanism
Let us define t2 (✓) ⌘ t2 , t2
 
✓¯
  ⌘ t¯2 , D⇤2 (✓) ⌘ D⇤2 , andD⇤2  ✓¯  ⌘ D¯⇤2 . The Incentive Compatibility Constraints
(ICC✓2 ) are:
t
2
+
K
⇣
✓,D
⇤
2
⌘
ˆ
z2
⇣
D
⇤
2
,x¯
⌘
⇣
Y2   z2
⇣
D
⇤
2
, x¯
⌘⌘
f2
⇣
Y2 | ✓, D
⇤
2
⌘
dY2   t¯2 +
K
⇣
✓,D¯
⇤
2
⌘
ˆ
z2
⇣
D¯
⇤
2
,x¯
⌘
⇣
Y2   z2
⇣
D¯
⇤
2
, x¯
⌘⌘
f2
⇣
Y2 | ✓, D¯
⇤
2
⌘
dY2 , (21)
t¯2 +
K
⇣
✓¯,D¯
⇤
2
⌘
ˆ
z2
⇣
D¯
⇤
2
,x¯
⌘
⇣
Y2   z2
⇣
D¯
⇤
2
, x¯
⌘⌘
f2
⇣
Y2 | ✓¯, D¯
⇤
2
⌘
dY2   t2 +
K
⇣
✓¯,D
⇤
2
⌘
ˆ
z2
⇣
D
⇤
2
,x¯
⌘
⇣
Y2   z2
⇣
D
⇤
2
, x¯
⌘⌘
f2
⇣
Y2 | ✓¯, D
⇤
2
⌘
dY2 , (22)
for ✓2 = ✓ and ✓2 = ✓¯ respectively, with z2
⇣
D
⇤
2
(✓2) , x¯
⌘
= D
⇤
2
(✓2) (from A1-A5), for ✓2 2
 
✓, ✓¯
 
.
When compared to the decentralized solution, the Participation Constraints (PC✓2 , for ✓2 2
 
✓, ✓¯
 
) are:
t
2
+
K
⇣
✓,D
⇤
2
⌘
ˆ
D
⇤
2
⇣
Y2   z2
⇣
D
⇤
2
, x¯
⌘⌘
f2
⇣
Y2 | ✓, D
⇤
2
⌘
dY2  
K
✓
✓,D
B
2
◆
ˆ
D
B
2
⇣
Y2   z2
⇣
D
B
2
, x¯
⌘⌘
f2
⇣
Y2 | ✓, D
B
2
⌘
dY2 , (23)
t¯2 +
K
⇣
✓¯,D¯
⇤
2
⌘
ˆ
z2
⇣
D¯
⇤
2
,x¯
⌘
⇣
Y2   z2
⇣
D¯
⇤
2
, x¯
⌘⌘
f2
⇣
Y2 | ✓¯, D¯
⇤
2
⌘
dY2  
K
⇣
✓¯,D¯
⇤
2
⌘
ˆ
z2
⇣
D¯
⇤
2
,x¯
⌘
⇣
Y2   z2
⇣
D¯
⇤
2
, x¯
⌘⌘
f2
⇣
Y2 | ✓¯, D¯
⇤
2
⌘
dY2 , (24)
for ✓2 = ✓ and ✓2 = ✓¯ respectively.
From (24), because the ✓¯ type’s borrowing choice is not distorted in the decentralized equilibrium, it is
straightforward to show that PC✓¯ holds 8t¯2   0. By contrast, from (23) and by construction of D
B
2
(✓), we
have that t
2
> 0 for PC✓ to hold.
Lemma 2. When compared to the decentralized borrowing level
⇣
D
B
2
(✓) , D
⇤
2
 
✓¯
 ⌘
, MU can implement eﬃ-
cient borrowing
 
D
⇤
2
(✓) , D
⇤
2
 
✓¯
  
by setting:
t
⇤
2
=
K
✓
✓,D
B
2
◆
ˆ
D
B
2
(✓)
⇣
Y2  D
B
2
⌘
f2
⇣
Y2 | ✓, D
B
2
⌘
dY2  
K
⇣
✓,D
⇤
2
⌘
ˆ
D
⇤
2
⇣
Y2  D
⇤
2
⌘
f2
⇣
Y2 | ✓, D
⇤
2
⌘
dY2 > 0 (25)
t¯
⇤
2
= 0. (26)
Proof. First, it is easily verified that the pair
 
t
⇤
2
, t¯
⇤
2
 
verifies PC✓2 as an equality, for ✓2 2
 
✓, ✓¯
 
. Second,
substituting (25)-(26) in (21), it is easily shown that ICC✓ also holds (as an equality). Finally, substituting
(25)-(26) in (22), by definition of D
⇤
2
 
✓¯
 
, we have that ICC✓¯ holds as a strict inequality.
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Figure 2: Separating Mechanism in the Presence of Bail-out.
The separating equilibrium constructed byMU – as defined in Lemma 2 – is denoted by the pair of pointsn
E
00
(✓) , E
⇤  
✓¯
 o
in Figure 2.
The ✓ type of S2 is made indiﬀerent between its decentralized allocation (under asymmetric information
and bail-out) and the mechanism proposed by MU . As in standard asymmetric information settings, an
information rent arises: in order to induce the ✓ type not to mimic the ✓¯ type and over-borrow, MU must
promise it a lump-sum transfer t
2
at least equal to its expected loss in utility.18 In Figure 2, the information
rent implies that the ✓ type allocation lies below the bail-out oﬀer curve OC  ✓¯ .
3.3.2 MU’s Pooling Mechanism
An alternative solution for MU to the separating mechanism constructed above is represented by a pooling
mechanism. More specifically, MU can set a unique level D
P
2
to act as a constraint on S2 ’s borrowing
independently of its type ✓2 . This is the solution MU can resort to whenever it finds it too diﬃcult - given
the imperfect observability of potential output - to establish each country’s cyclical position.
18Alternatively, MU could have imposed a fine for over-borrowing (with respect to D
⇤
2
), still taking ICC✓ into account.
However, this would not make the separating mechanism a Pareto dominant outcome, as the ✓¯ type would be negatively
aﬀected. Because the Pareto analysis is a main component of our paper, we focus on the allocation defined in Lemma 2.
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Figure 3: Pooling and Separating Solutions in the Presence of Bail-out.
To determine the optimal pooling constraint, MU solves:
max
{D1 ,D2}
U1 (D1 , x¯) + ↵2U2 (✓, D2 , x¯) + (1  ↵2)U2
 
✓¯, D2 , x¯
 
(27)
s.t. ↵2E
 
R2
 
Y2 , x¯ | ✓¯, D2
  
+ (1  ↵2)E {R2 (Y2 , x¯ | ✓, D2)} = D2 ,
z1 = D1 .
Given A1-A5, it is easily seen that MU sets D1 = D
⇤
1
. From (4), MU ’s optimal choice of D2 is:
D
P
2
(↵2) = argmax
D2
↵2
8><>:
K(✓¯,D2)ˆ
D2
(Y2  D2) f2
 
Y2 | ✓¯, D2
 
dY2
9>=>;+ (28)
+(1  ↵2)
8><>:
K(✓,D2)ˆ
D2
(Y2  D2) f2 (Y2 | ✓, D2) dY2  
D2ˆ
0
(D2   Y2) f2 (Y2 | ✓, D2) dY2
9>=>; ,
where, z2 = D2 because of bail-out. From (7), it is straightforward to show that the solution to MU ’s
problem is given by:
D
P
2
(↵2) = ↵2D
⇤
2
 
✓¯
 
+ (1  ↵2)D
⇤
2
(✓) . (29)
The optimal pooling solution on borrowing is represented by the point E
P
in Figure 3. E
P
lays on OC
 
✓¯
 
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– because of bail-out – between E
0
(✓) and E
⇤  
✓¯
 
: the higher ↵2 is, the closer is E
P
to E
⇤  
✓¯
 
.
3.3.3 Pareto Analysis
We are interested in conducting a Pareto analysis of the diﬀerent mechanisms computed in the previous
subsections. More specifically, we compare the following outcomes in terms of their welfare implications for
all the players involved, i.e., S1 and both types of S2 :
1.
n
E
B
(✓) , E
⇤  
✓¯
 o
: the outcome arising under asymmetric information and bail-out, and absent MU ’s
intervention;
2.
n
E
00
(✓) , E
⇤  
✓¯
 o
: the outcome arising under asymmetric information and bail-out, when MU imple-
ments a separating mechanism (see Lemma 2);
3. E
P
: the outcome arising under asymmetric information and bail-out, when MU implements a pooling
mechanism.
In the following, we interpret the levels of D2 chosen by MU as upperbounds on S2 ’s level of borrowing
rather than as a fixed level of borrowing. It should be clear from our discussion that this interpretation can
only improve welfare within the monetary union.19
We proceed by comparing first
n
E
B
(✓) , E
⇤  
✓¯
 o
to
n
E
00
(✓) , E
⇤  
✓¯
 o
.
Proposition 2. The separating mechanism
n⇣
t
⇤
2
, D
⇤
2
⌘
,
 
t¯
⇤
2
, D¯
⇤
2
 o
Pareto dominates the decentralized outcome
in which the ✓¯-type of S2 invests D¯
⇤
2
, and the ✓-type of S2 invests D
B
2
(✓).
Proof. First, by construction, the separating mechanism
⇣
t
⇤
2
, D
⇤
2
⌘
,
 
t¯
⇤
2
, D¯
⇤
2
 
Pareto dominates the decentral-
ized solution for both types of S2 (see Lemma 2).
Second, from (4) and (25), S1 ’s expected utility from the separating mechanism is:
U
S
1
(↵2 , x¯) = U
⇤
1
  (1  ↵2)
8>><>>:
K
✓
✓,D
B
2
◆
ˆ
D
B
2
⇣
Y2  D
B
2
⌘
f2
⇣
Y2 | ✓, D
B
2
⌘
dY2  
2664
K
⇣
✓,D
⇤
2
⌘
ˆ
0
Y2f2
⇣
Y2 | ✓, D
⇤
2
⌘
dY2  D
⇤
2
3775
9>>=>>; ,
(30)
19See the proof of Proposition 3.
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and S1 ’s expected utility from the decentralized solution is given by (19), which we report for simplicity:
U
B
1
(↵2 , x¯) = U
⇤
1
  (1  ↵2)
D
B
2ˆ
0
⇣
D
B
2
  Y2
⌘
f2
⇣
Y2 | ✓, D
B
2
⌘
dY2 .
Hence, from (30) and (19), S1 has a higher utility under the separating mechanism rather than the
decentralized solution if:
K
⇣
✓,D
⇤
2
⌘
ˆ
0
Y2f2
⇣
Y2 | ✓, D
⇤
2
⌘
dY2  D
⇤
2
 
K
✓
✓,D
B
2
(✓,x¯)
◆
ˆ
0
Y2f2
⇣
Y2 | ✓, D
B
2
(✓, x¯)
⌘
dY2  D
B
2
(✓, x¯) , (31)
which holds by definition of D
⇤
2
.
In the presence of asymmetric information and bail-out, S1 finds it profitable to compensate the ✓ type
of S2 with a lump-sum amount of money to induce it to self-select on the eﬃcient amount of borrowing.
Because (i) total welfare within the Monetary Union increases and (ii) the separating mechanism is such
that both types of S2 are indiﬀerent between the eﬃcient level of borrowing and the decentralized solution,
S1 appropriates the eﬃciency gains created by this type-contingent mechanism. In other words, S1 prefers
to pay a certain lump-sum transfer rather than face the expected cost of a potential bail-out.
Even though the separating mechanism we propose Pareto dominates the decentralized solution – at the
MU level – it is important to understand whether the separating mechanism Pareto dominates the pooling
mechanism.
Proposition 3. There exists a unique threshold ↵
⇤
2
such that, for ↵2   ↵
⇤
2
, the separating mechanismn⇣
t
⇤
2
, D
⇤
2
⌘
,
 
t¯
⇤
2
, D¯
⇤
2
 o
Pareto dominates the pooling rule D
P
2
(↵2).
Proof. From (29), we have D
P
2
(↵2) 2
h
D
⇤
2
, D¯
⇤
2
i
, where D
P
2
(↵2) is increasing in ↵2 . Hence, there exists a
unique value ↵˜2 such that, for ↵2 = ↵˜2 , we have D
P
2
(↵˜2) = D
B
2
(✓).
Consider first ↵2   ↵˜2 . In this case, the pooling rule D
P
2
(↵2) is Pareto dominated by the decentralized
solution
⇣
D
B
2
(✓) , D
⇤
2
 
✓¯
 ⌘
. In fact (i) the ✓ type of S2 is indiﬀerent between the decentralized solution and
the pooling rule as D
P
2
(↵2)   D
B
2
(✓) and it optimally borrows D
B
2
(✓), (ii) the ✓¯ type of S2 is better-oﬀ
– strictly better-oﬀ for ↵2 > ↵˜2 – under the decentralized solution, because it can borrow at the eﬃcient
level, and (iii) S1 is indiﬀerent between the decentralized solution and the pooling rule, because the ✓ type
19
of S2 borrows D
B
2
(✓) in both cases and the ✓¯ type is ’risk-free’. Hence, because the separating mecha-
nism
n⇣
t
⇤
2
, D
⇤
2
⌘
,
 
t¯
⇤
2
, D¯
⇤
2
 o
Pareto dominates the decentralized solution (see Proposition 2), it also Pareto
dominates the pooling rule D
P
2
(↵2) for ↵2   ↵˜2 .
Consider now ↵2 < ↵˜2 . In this case, from both types of S2 obtain a higher utility under the separating
mechanism rather than the pooling rule: by construction, under the separating mechanism, the ✓ type
obtains the payoﬀ of the decentralized outcome, and the ✓¯ type borrows eﬃciently and, therefore, obtains
the highest possible payoﬀ. Hence, to perform our Pareto analysis, we need to compare S1 ’s payoﬀs under
the two rules. For easy of reference, we report S1 ’s payoﬀ from the pooling rule U
P
1
(↵2) and the separating
mechanism U
S
1
(↵2):
U
P
1
(↵2) = U
⇤
1
+ (1  ↵2)
2664
D
P
2
(↵2)ˆ
0
⇣
D
P
2
(↵2)  Y2
⌘
f2
⇣
Y2 | ✓, D
P
2
(↵2)
⌘
dY2
3775 , (32)
U
S
1
(↵2) = U
⇤
1
  (1  ↵2)
8>><>>:
K
✓
✓,D
B
2
◆
ˆ
D
B
2
⇣
Y2  D
B
2
⌘
f2
⇣
Y2 | ✓, D
B
2
⌘
dY2  
2664
K
⇣
✓,D
⇤
2
⌘
ˆ
0
Y2f2
⇣
Y2 | ✓, D
⇤
2
⌘
dY2  D
⇤
2
3775
9>>=>>; .
(33)
(32) can be rewritten as:
U
P
1
(↵2 ) = U
⇤
1
 (1  ↵2 )
8>><>>:
K
✓
✓,D
P
2
(↵2 )
◆
ˆ
D
P
2
(↵2 )
⇣
Y2  D
P
2
(↵2 )
⌘
f2
⇣
Y2 | ✓, D
P
2
(↵2 )
⌘
dY2  
266664
K
✓
✓,D
P
2
(↵2 )
◆
ˆ
0
Y2f2
⇣
Y2 | ✓, D
P
2
(↵2 )
⌘
dY2  D
P
2
(↵2 )
377775
9>>=>>; .
(34)
Hence, from (33) and (34), U
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(↵2) if:
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Notice that:
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by definition of D
B
2
, where the equality holds for ↵2 = ↵˜2 . Also:
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ˆ
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Y2 | ✓, D
⇤
2
⌘
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 
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ˆ
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Y2f2
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Y2 | ✓, D
P
2
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⌘
dY2  D
P
2
(↵2) , (37)
by definition of D
⇤
2
, where the equality holds for ↵2 = 0.
Hence, from (33)-(34) and (36)-(37), we have that U
P
1
(0) > U
S
1
(0) and U
S
1
(↵˜2) > U
P
1
(↵˜2). Also, the
RHS in (35) is independent of ↵2 . Because (i) the first term of the left-hand-side (LHS) in (35) is increasing
in ↵2 and (ii) the second term of the left-hand-side (LHS) in (35) is decreasing in ↵2 , the LHS in (35) is
increasing in ↵2 . This finally establishes that there exists a unique threshold ↵
⇤
2
2 (0, ↵˜2) such that the
separating mechanism Pareto dominates the pooling rule for ↵2   ↵
⇤
2
.
As ↵2 increases, on the one hand, the expected cost to S1 of the separating mechanism decreases, because
the probability of S2 being the recipient of the transfer is smaller; on the other hand, the expected cost to
S1 of bail-out under the pooling equilibrium (i) increases because of the higher deficit-ceiling (D
P
2
) and (ii)
decreases because of the lower probability that bail-out occurs. However, by construction, S1 strictly prefers
allocationg the ’low potential output-type’ of S2 the transfer t
⇤
2
rather than incurring the expected cost of
bail-out when D2 (✓) = D
B
2
: as ↵2 increases, because of (i), the separating mechanism becomes less costly to
S1 than the pooling mechanism and, as a consequence, becomes Pareto dominant.
Figure 4 plots S1 ’s utility from the (i) decentralized, (ii) pooling, and (iii) separating solutions. Figure 5
plots the utilities the ✓ type (Figure 5a) and the ✓¯ type (Figure 5b) of S2 obtain from the three alternative
solutions.
In Figure 4, S1 ’s utility from the separating mechanism (U
S
1
) is higher than its utility from the decentral-
ized solution (U
B
1
), 8↵2 2 [0, 1] (see Proposition 2); also, for ↵2 < ↵˜2 , S1 ’s utility from the pooling mechanism
(U
P
1
) is higher than its utility from the decentralized mechanism, while the two utilities are the same for
↵2   ↵˜2 (see the proof of Proposition 3). In Figure 5a, the bold horizontal line represents S2 ’s utility from
both the separating and the decentralized mechanism when S2 is characterized by a low potential output
(i.e., U
S
2
(✓) = U
B
2
(✓)); S2 obtains a strictly lower utility from the pooling mechanism – with respect to the
alternative solutions – for ↵2 < ↵˜2 , while S2 ’s utility is independent of the solution adopted for ↵2   ↵˜2 .
Finally, in Figure 5b, the bold horizontal line represents S2 ’s utility from both the separating and the decen-
tralized mechanism when S2 is characterized by a high potential output (i.e., U
S
2
 
✓¯
 
= U
B
2
 
✓¯
 
); S2 obtains
a strictly lower utility from the pooling mechanism – with respect to the alternative solutions – 8↵2 2 [0, 1].
Figure 4 and Figure 5 graphically show that the separating mechanism Pareto dominates both the pooling
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Figure 4: Country 1’s Utility under the (i) Decentralized, (ii) Pooling, and (iii) Separating
Solutions.
Figure 5: Country 2’s Utility under the (i) Decentralized, (ii) Pooling, and (iii) Separating
Solutions.
(a) Low Potential Output. (b) High Potential Output.
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and the decentralized solutions for ↵2   ↵
⇤
2
.
To sum up, in the presence of asymmetric information and bail-out, as the prior probability that S2 ’s
type has a high potential output increases, it pays oﬀ to allMU ’s member states to design a mechanism that
make each type of S2 self-select in its eﬃcient level of borrowing. In fact, both types of S2 gain from this
mechanism: when characterized by a low potential output, S2 does not overborrow on the financial market
and receives a positive trasfer from the union; when characterized by a large potential output, S2 has access
to its eﬃcient level of borrowing. S1 also gains from the separating mechanism, as it avoids the increasing
expected cost of bailing S2 out when characterized by a low potential output, in exchange of the payment of
a fixed transfer to S2 (when characterized by a low potential output).
4 A Comparison with EMU’s Current Fiscal Framework
As discussed in Section 2, the fiscal framework currently implemented within the European Monetary Union
(EMU) encompasses a ‘cyclically-adjusted’ cap on member states’ borrowing level. More specifically, from
(1), the target imposed on each member state regarding the nominal deficit-to-GDP ratio is adjusted – i.e.,
relaxed – were the member state to experience a negative output gap. Obviously, the size of the borrowing
constraint’s relaxation depends on the member state’s potential output. Because Excessive Deficit Procedures
are iniziated only in case a member state overborrows with respect to its cyclically-adjusted cap, each member
state has an incentive to misrepresent (upward) its potential output so as to run a higher nominal deficit.
Depending on whether we believe that member states are able to aﬀect EMU ’s final estimates of their
own potential outptut, the current EMU ’s fiscal framework is captured in two diﬀerent ways. If one believes
that EMU (possibly partially) bases its fiscal policy on the member state’s estimates of their own potential
output, the European fiscal policy is similar to one in which EMU oﬀers to a member state the possibility
to choose between two cyclically-adjusted deficit-to-GDP thresholds – i.e., D
⇤
(✓) and D
⇤  
✓¯
 
– where none
of the two borrowing upperbounds are subject to a fine (i.e., t (✓) = 0, for ✓ 2  ✓, ✓¯ ). As shown in the
previous section, because of bail-out, if member states are given the possibility to choose between these two
borrowing thesholds, they prefer to run a high deficit-to-GDP ratio irrespective of their cyclical position. If
one believes that EMU only makes use of its own estimates (↵ 2 [0, 1]) of a member state’s potential output
instead, the current European fiscal policy corresponds to one in which MU sets a single pooling borrowing
threshold D
P
(↵). In that sense, point D
P
(↵) is the (country-specific) MTO currently set by EMU : in this
second case also, overborrowing occurs when a member state is characterized by a low potential output (i.e.,
when ✓ = ✓).
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To rephrase it, in the presence of asymmetric information and bail-out, the attempt to implement a more
eﬃcient policy may well degenerate into an ineﬃcient overborrowing at the Union level. In light of the
explanation we put forward in this paper, it is not surprising, then, we observe many member states running
excessive deficits and, therefore, postponing the achievement of their Medium Term Objective (European
Central Bank [2015]).
Provided EMU aims at implementing a cyclically-adjusted mechanism while eliciting member states’
private information, the mechanism proposed in this paper presents one major diﬀerence with respect to the
current European fiscal framework: to avoid overborrowing when a member state is not far from its potential,
the low deficit required from a member state characterized by a low potential output must come with an
ex-post transfer to be received from the other members of the Union. Possibly, it can be a transfer specifically
aimed at raising its potential output. Under this light, the mechanism we propose can be seen as a device to
reduce national borrowing (which may or may not be aimed at permanently raise the potential output level)
and increase expenditure. This mechanism has two crucial features: (i) it comes from the “federal” level,
therefore it implies a degree of fiscal risk sharing within the Union, and (ii) it can be specifically targeted
towards goals (possibly jointly determined between the nation state and the monetary union) regarding
a permanent increase of a member state’s production possibilities, because these states are the optimal
recipients of the transfers.
5 Concluding Remarks
The model presented in this paper captures the main features of a fiscal framework within a monetary union
in the presence of (i) asymmetric information over member states’ fundamentals – i.e., potential output and,
therefore, output gap – and (ii) bail-out among member states when shocks jeopardize the ability of some
members to pay back their debt. In such an environment, optimal counter-cyclical fiscal policies are not
incentive-compatible because bail-out (a) incentivizes member states to misreprent their current output gap
and overborrow on the financial market. Furthermore, bail-out lowers lenders’ (member states’) incentives
to discriminate among borrowers’ (signal their) cyclical position.
Unlike single member states, the monetary union internalizes the externalites and distortions created
by the interplay between asymmetric information and bail-out and designs a mechanism to discriminates
borrowers based on the magnitude of their potential output. Such a mechanism implies the payment by
the monetary union of a lump-sum transfer to the member state characterized by a lower (negative) output
gap – and, therefore, a smaller magnitude of the government spending multiplier – so that each member
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state can self-select into its eﬃcient level of borrowing. The eﬃciency gains generated by this separating
mechanism makes it Pareto dominant with respect to a decentralized equilibrium in which member states are
unconstrained in their borrowing choice. Mostly, provided there is a suﬃciently high prior probability that
the member state is characterized by a high potential output, the separating mechanism Pareto dominates
a pooling rule in which the monetary union sets a unique borrowing constraint. Because the pooling rule is
probably the best approximation of the current cyclically-adjusted rule under the Fiscal Compact Treaty,
our results has important policy implications.
The fiscal framework currently implemented within the European Monetary Union induces ineﬃcient
overborrowing by member states. Many observers note that the future of the European Union’s economic
and political integration relies on its ability to deeply reform this framework, as it has been made evident by
the 2012 bail-out of Greece. Our opinion is that there are thee alternative options ahead of this process: (i)
member states manage to work out an unambigous and perfectly observable measure of potential output, so
to eradicate the asymmetric information problem, (ii) the European Union acknowledges the existence of an
asymmetric information problem that makes the implementation of fiscal rules based on potential output too
complicated and, therefore, goes back to solely nominal targets, or (iii) the European Union acknowledges the
existence of an asymmetric information problem and reforms its fiscal framework to tackle it. The mechanism
proposed in this paper is an attempt to explore the theoretical implications of this last option.
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